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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
GARY CHRISTIAN DAVIS 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 20050952 
REPLY BRIEF 
ARGUMENT 
THE ENACTMENT OF HOUSE BILL 178 DID NOT 
CHANGE THE RULE OF LAW APPLICABLE TO THE 
INSTANT CASE. 
The State concedes that in State v. Davis, 711 P.2d 232 (Utah 1985), the 
Utah Supreme Court "carved out, but did not clearly define, an exception for 'innocent 
handling' of a dangerous weapon." Appellee's Brief at 10-11. However, the State 
contends that the defendant's reliance on Davis is misplaced because the "innocent 
handling" of a weapon was criminalized by the intervening enactment of H.B. 178 in the 
general session of the 2003 Legislature. Laws of Utah 2003, chapter 235, § 1 (effective 
May 5, 2003). See Appellee's Brief at 10. 
When Davis was decided in 1985, Section 76-10-503(2), Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, read in relevant part as follows: 
(a) Any person who is on parole for a felony. . . may not 
have in his possession or under his custody or control any 
dangerous weapon . . . 
(b) Any person who violates this section is guilty of a third 
degree felony, and if the dangerous weapon is a firearm,... 
he is guilty of a second degree felony. 
In 2000, the Legislature enacted H.B. 363 which repealed and reenacted 
Section 76-10-503, creating two categories of restricted persons. See Laws of Utah 
2000, chapter 90, § 1 (effective May 1, 2000). Under this bill, a person who had been 
convicted of any violent felony or who was on probation or parole for any felony was 
classified as a Category I restricted person, while a person who had been convicted of 
any other felony or was under indictment for any felony was classified as a Category II 
restricted person. Subsection (2)(a), as then amended, went on to provide that a 
"Category I restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, uses, or has under his 
custody or control any firearm is guilty of a second degree felony...."; and subsection 
(3)(a) provided that a "Category II restricted person who purchases, transfers, possesses, 
uses, or has under his custody or control any firearm is guilty of a third degree felony... 
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The State is apparently prepared to concede that this complete overhaul of 
Section 76-10-503 that occurred in 2000 was not calculated to eliminate what the State 
itself has characterized as the "exception for 'innocent handling' of a dangerous 
weapon." Appellee's Brief at 11. Instead, the State's brief focuses on the 2003 
amendments of Section 76-10-503, arguing that these amendments "clarifie[d] and 
narrow[ed] the ambiguous 1985 statute." See Appellee's Brief at 11. 
The State's argument is based entirely upon the construction of the 
language of the 2003 amendments and avoids any reference to the legislative history. 
The 2003 legislation added the underscored language to subsection (2) of Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-503: 
(2) A Category I restricted person who intentionally or 
knowingly agrees, consents, offers, or arranges to purchase, 
transfer, possess, use, or have under his custody or control, or 
who intentionally or knowingly purchases, transfers, 
possesses, uses, or has under his custody or control: (a) any 
firearm is guilty of a second degree felony;... 
Just how the addition of this language is supposed to have criminalized the 
"innocent handling" of a dangerous weapon is not clear from the State's argument. See 
Appellee's Brief at 11-13. Indeed, the 2003 amendments appear to have been directed 
toward the criminalization of conspiratorial conduct, the conscious objective of which is 
the purchase, transfer, possession or use of a dangerous weapon. 
Representative Ty McCartney, who sponsored HB 178, explained the 
legislative objectives as follows: 
House Bill 178 modifies provisions related to weapons by 
expanding the restrictions on the purchased of firearms by 
Category I restricted persons. 
* * # 
For those of you that don't know, I'm a detective with the 
Salt Lake Metro Gang Unit in my real life and what brought 
this bill to my attention is the inability to prosecute and arrest 
violent gang members that were attempting to purchase 
firearms for either themselves or other gang members. In 
order to prosecute and arrest them we would actually have to 
put an operational firearm in their hands to proceed with the 
case. This statute is similar to what the control substance 
statute does that's been in place for 20 years. And that's what 
this bill is attempting to do. 
Tape of House Floor Debates, 55th Legislature, General Session (Jan. 27, 2003). 
Following Representative McCartney's introductory comments, the 
following discussion ensued: 
REPRESENTATIVE CURTIS: Representative, in the 
criminal code you have a section in front of the code that 
deals with attempt and conspiracy. Why would this . . . 
would it not be an attempt to purchase a firearm from a 
Category I person underneath that definition of the code? 
Why would that not already cover this criminal section? 
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: Well, as Mr. Boyden 
from the Statewide Association of Prosecutors explained to 
me, this is different because they're actually... at the new 
language here in this bill can be found online starting on line 
36 and line 37. And that is Category I restricted person who 
agrees, consents offers, or arranges to purchase, transfer, 
possess, use, or have under his custody or control. This is not 
an attempt. This is, this is the act that we are trying to 
prosecute. Not the attempt to agree, or consent, or offer, or 
arrange. 
REPRESENTATIVE CURTIS: So is it law enforcement's 
position that if I'm a Category I felon and I make 
arrangements with you in a bar to purchase a firearm and we 
agree to meet in the back of the bar and you show up with a 
firearm and I show up with cash and I give you two hundred 
dollars cash, that I actually have to take possession of the 
firearm in order to be guilty of a crime? 
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: Under current law, 
yes. We have to actually place a firearm in your hands. Yes. 
REPRESENTATIVE CURTIS: So that doesn't constitute . . 
. ? What about a conspiracy? If I sit in the bar and I talk with 
you about doing that and you tell me, "Yes I know where you 
can buy some weapons, and I have a third party that I can call 
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and get those," that doesn't constitute a conspiracy to commit 
that crime? 
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: Then that's a good 
question and I would actually like to consult with. . . . I don't 
know. As far as conspiracy, this does not relate to the 
scenario that you just gave. 
REPRESENTATIVE CURTIS: Thank you then. Mr. 
Speaker, the only — the question I raise as representatives is, 
if you — often times know we got to turn to our law and order 
expertise here, but what happens is if an individual is charged 
with attempted homicide or an attempt or a conspiracy to 
commit a crime, what it essentially does is that you don't 
have all those crimes detailed out in the criminal code. What 
you have is the crime detailed out, for example, as homicide 
and then the attempt over here says if you take steps to do 
that or the conspiracy is if you work with others to conspire 
to commit this and so you can have attempt of just about any 
crime. You can have an attempt to assault somebody. You 
know attempted homicide. You can have an attempted 
robbery. All those different things can be an attempt or a 
conspiracy. So if you sit down with a group of people and 
you plan out how you're going to rob a bank. And you go get 
plans and you do all those things and you decide how you're 
going to do that, you're guilty of a crime. Now what we've 
done here is we've taken this law and said okay we're going 
to expand that and we're going to make that the primary 
offense is attempt. So I guess the ultimate question would be 
is now if you put this in the law and it says you agree, a 
person agrees or arranges to purchase, so if I attempt to agree 
have I committed a crime? And I just — I understand that this 
is what's in the drug code. But I just struggle with the 
concept that they're saying — cuz I would disagree with our 
prosecutors, okay. If you make arrangements as a Category I 
person to purchase a firearm, you meet in the back of the bar 
and you give the guy two hundred dollars and then he flashes 
out a badge and says, "Sorry, Salt Lake Metro Gang," 'Kay. 
It's not going to be much of a defense to say, "Well, I never 
touched that firearm." 'Kay. Cuz they don't always show up 
in the drug code — they don't always show up with real 
drugs. If you think you're buying real drugs, you give money 
for that and then they give you a white, powdery substance 
that is not real drugs, guess what ~ you're still guilty of a 
crime. 'Kay. And so let's make sure if we want to expand 
that or not. Thank you. 
Id. 
Following the debate, HB 178 failed to pass on a vote of 17 in favor of the 
proposed legislation and 51 opposed. The bill was revived on Day 12 of the session, 
where upon the sponsor offered the following amendments to the proposed legislation 
and the reasons therefor: 
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: I'd like to move an 
amendment. 
MR. SPEAKER: Proceed. 
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: On line 36, insert after 
"who," "intentionally or knowingly." And on line 37, after 
"who," insert "intentionally or knowingly." 
MR. SPEAKER: Intentionally or knowingly. 'Kay, we have 
that. Do you want to speak to the amendment? 
ELEPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: Yes, after speaking to 
Representative Curtis and calling up his concerns also with 
prosecutor Paul Boyden with the Statewide Association of 
Prosecutors and also speaking with Utah Gun Owner's 
Association, this is all language that makes this palatable. 
This increases this to the highest degree of mens rea and also 
clarifies the culpability. This does not change the intent of 
the bill, it just satisfies the concerns that Representative 
Curtis had. With that I believe you know the intent of the bill 
and would appreciate your support this time. 
MR. SPEAKER: Further discussion to the motion to amend. 
Seeing no further lights. Representative McCartney, for 
summation. 
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: I'll waive. 
£ 
MR. SPEAKER: Summation's waived. The motion to 
amend is found on lines 36 and line 37. After the word 
"who," in both instances, we insert the words "intentionally 
or knowingly." Those in favor of the motion to amend say 
"aye." Opposed say "no." Motion passes. The bill is for 
further discussion. Representative McCartney. 
REPRESENTATIVE McCARTNEY: I just had one last 
comment on this bill. The initial intent of this bill was 
primarily focused on felonious gang members, but as I 
proceeded with this bill there was a Utah County detective 
whose worked numerous murder-for-hire cases, usually 
involving murder of spouses and he indicated that this would 
be a great bill for him, or a great law to have in place. Often 
times the people approaching him wanting, to either have 
their spouse killed is looking for a gun first and this would be 
at least a first step in addressing his concerns. So, with that 
being said, I would appreciate your support in moving this on 
to the Senate. Thank you. 
Tape of House Floor Debates, 55th Legislature, General Session (Jan. 31,2003). 
With this amendment, the legislation was approved by the House of 
Representatives. 
This is the history of the 2003 amendments. Clearly, this legislation was 
not enacted for the purpose of eliminating the "exception for innocent handling' of a 
dangerous weapon" which the Utah Supreme Court "carved out" in State v. Davis. See 
Appellee's Brief at 10-11. The Legislature overwhelmingly rejected the proposed 
legislation until it was amended to require proof of the highest blameworthy state of 
mind. Clearly, this legislation was not calculated as a measure that would override the 
policy recognized by the language of State v. Davis and would criminalize the brief 
handling of a weapon under circumstances which do not evidence "a willing and 
knowing possession with the intent to control its use or management." Davis, 711 P.2d 
at 233. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that the defendant's 
conviction of POSSESSION OF A DANGEROUS WEAPON BY A RESTRICTED 
PERSON must be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 2006. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this day July, 2006,1 did personally mail or cause 
to be mailed, U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, two (2) true and correct copies of the above and 
foregoing RELY BRIEF to Joanne C. Slotnik, Assistant Utah Attorney General, 
Appeals Division, 160 East 300 South, 6th Fir., P.O. Box 140854, Salt Lake City, UT 
84114-0854. 
Gary W. Pendleton 
8 
